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REPLY TO SARAH BURNS
RUTH COLKER
I am a lawyer, academic, and feminist who has often found it
difficult to integrate these aspects of myself. I therefore decided
to write an essay to ask the feminist community why and how
we are to use the courts in constitutional litigation consistent with
our feminist understanding of society as well as our vision for
the future. I wanted to engage in dialogue with feminists and
make some modest suggestions to help us be more persuasive
and effective in our feminist efforts. I sought publication in the
Harvard Women's Law Journal so that I could speak directly
with feminists. I was thrilled to have Sarah Bums, one of the
leading women's rights activists in the United States, respond to
my essay.'
The core disagreement between Burns and myself seems to be
strategic-whether a group-based, equality argument that focuses
on women's position in society and "lets in the fetus" would be
an effective, feminist argument against societal coercion of wom-
en's reproductive choices. I believe that such an argument would
be more effective than the present privacy approach which does
not centrally discuss women's well-being or acknowledge the
importance of valuing fetal life.2 Rather than re-elaborate my
theoretical reasons for preferring an equality approach to a pri-
vacy approach, 3 I would like to apply the equality approach to
the Angela Carder case.4 The reader can then judge whether my
'See Sarah Bums, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, in this Volume.
Hereinafter references to this work will be noted in the text as (Bums, p.._).
2 1 do not hold my position because it is "feminine"; I hold it because I believe it is
feminist, i.e., that it will further women's well-being in society. I also do not try to transfer
consciousness-raising to litigation without sensitivity to the changed context. The impor-
tant point is to be aware of the shortcomings of each mode of discourse and to consider
context carefully when deciding which mode to use.
3 My reasons include the following: (1) a group-based, radical approach is more con-
sistent with how feminists consider the abortion issue, (2) an equality approach, if suc-
cessful, provides fuller protection to all women in society, (3) many members of society
value fetal life, so that we act at our own peril in not responding to beliefs that are most
likely present in our audiences' minds, and (4) a privacy approach feeds right into the
"women are selfish" mentality to which Bums alludes.
4 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 617 (D.C. 1987).
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approach is feminist and persuasive.5 Before Angela Carder be-
came pregnant, she understood that her pregnancy would be high-
risk as a result of her having leukemia. 6 She had married at age
twenty-seven, at which time her cancer had been in remission
for three years. She had not undergone chemotherapy for over a
year. At that time she and her husband decided to have a child
together, and she soon became pregnant.
7
At the twenty-fifth week of her pregnancy, Ms. Carder saw a
physician when she experienced shortness of breath and back
pains. She was diagnosed as having a tumor on her lungs. She
was admitted to the hospital on June 11, 1987, and her condition
was diagnosed as terminalA At first, she was told that she would
die within weeks; on June 15, 1987, she was told that she might
die much sooner.9
Ms. Carder could have insisted on passive treatment, in which
case she and her fetus would have died relatively quickly. In-
- It is difficult to make equality arguments under the Court's present interpretation of
the equal protection clause because of the combination of Geduldig and Feeney. See
Dwight Gedudlig v. Carolyn Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (concluding that preg-
nancy-based distinctions do not constitute sex-based classifications); Personnel Admin-
istrator v. Helen Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that classifications that adversely
affect one sex are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny unless classification itself is
sex-based or adverse effect reflects "purposeful discrimination"). I have two modest
suggestions for overcoming this problem. As I have outlined in an earlier paper, first, we
could argue that an action predicated on disrespect for women's well-being violates the
due process clause's liberty component. We could argue that Ms. Carder's right to her
own life falls within the liberty protections of the due process clause. Second, we could
rely on the equal protection clause by challenging the "but for" causation requirement of
Feeney rather than the "pregnancy is not a sex-based condition" holding of Geduldig.
See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1013, 1045-46 (1990). The argument would be that the "but
for" causation requirement is based on a race discrimination model in which we expect
to find actual hatred of the group that is being treated unconstitutionally. Id. Although
men sometimes treat women with disrespect because they hate women, I do not believe
that such an account adequately describes the nature of discrimination against women.
It is equally likely that discrimination against women occurs because men act paternal-
istically without inquiring into the understanding women have of their own best interest,
or, as in Ms. Carder's case, without giving serious consideration to women's well-being.
I suggest that the Feeney test for non-sex-based classifications that adversely impact
women should inquire as to whether the actions are predicated on disrespect for women's
well-being. As I argued above, there is compelling evidence that such disrespect served
as a predicate for the hospital's actions in the Carder case. Although these arguments are
difficult to make doctrinally, I believe they are worth making, especially given the growing
disrepute of privacy doctrine.
6 533 A.2d at 612.
7 See id.; see George J. Annas, She's Going to Die: The Case ofAngela C., HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT, Feb.-Mar. 1988, 23, 23.
8 533 A.2d at 612.
9 See Annas, supra note 6, at 23.
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stead, she agreed to life-sustaining treatment so that a cesarean
section could be performed at the twenty-eighth week of her
pregnancy and the fetus could be given a reasonable chance to
live. 10 To the extent that her wishes could be ascertained, it
appeared that she did not want the cesarean section performed
before the twenty-eighth week because of the strong likelihood
that the fetus might be severely disabled, if it could live at all.1
She also wanted her own health and comfort to receive primary
consideration. 12 She apparently believed that it would be in every-
one's interest for her to stay alive for two more weeks and have
the cesarean section performed at that time. 3 Ms. Carder's hus-
band and mother-the people who would most directly feel the
loss of Ms. Carder's life as well as the effects of the loss or
survival of the fetus-apparently agreed with her resolution of
this difficult moral and ethical dilemma. 14
Despite Ms. Carder's and her family's expression of their opin-
ions, the hospital sought a declaratory order from the Superior
Court "as to what it should do in terms of the fetus. 15 A "hear-
ing" was convened at the hospital, without Ms. Carder present.
The judge then decided to order a cesarean section so that the
fetus would have an opportunity to live; he did not discuss the
action's consequences for Ms. Carder's life. 16 The judge was
informed shortly thereafter that Ms. Carder was awake and had
clearly communicated that she did not want a cesarean section
performed at that time.17 However, after reconvening the court,
he affirmed his original order, saying that the order was appro-
priate even if she refused to consent. 8 The entire "hearing"
apparently took about an hour.19
IId.
"See id. (citing testimony of attending physician). But see 533 A.2d. at 613 (noting
that Ms. Carder had not been given opportunity to decide between relinquishing her life
and the life of the fetus in the event that decision had to be made prior to 28 weeks).
12 See Annas, supra note 6, at 23.
13 See id.; 533 A.2d at 613.
' See Annas, supra note 6, at 23.
IS 533 A.2d at 612.
16 Id. at 612-13.
17 See Annas, supra note 6, at 24 (citing testimony of Alan Weingold, Chief of Obstet-
rics, who reported that Ms. Carder had mouthed the words "I don't want it done" when
asked to consent to the surgery after court's initial decision).
18 Id. at 24 (although the judge indicated he was not sure what her intent was, he
concurred in suggestion of Counsel for District of Columbia that "her current refusal did
not change anything because the entire proceeding had been premised on the belief that
she was refusing to consent.").
19 Id.
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A ten-minute appeal took place in a telephone conversation
with a three-judge panel. The panel denied the request for a stay.
20
Doctors performed the nonconsensual abortion2 on Ms. Car-
der, and the nonviable fetus died approximately two hours later.
Ms. Carder died approximately two days later; her death was
most likely hastened by the abortion.2 2 Five months later, the
court of appeals issued its opinion which, in Bums' view, was
premised on the assumption that Ms. Carder's and her family's
wishes could be discounted as "selfish." (Bums, p. 204 & note
2) 1 believe the most effective feminist argument about the Carder
case would reveal (1) that the hospital's and court's actions were
predicated on an unconstitutional disrespect for Ms. Carder's
well-being as a woman,23 and (2) that such unconstitutional action
could not be justified in the name of protecting fetal life, because
judicial intervention did not better serve the interest in protecting
life than Ms. Carder's own decision.2 4 By contrast, I believe that
the traditional feminist privacy argument would not effectively
show how the specific coercive actions were unconstitutional.
Rather, it would feed into the stereotype of women's selfishness
by not placing the case in its broader context25 and not affirming
how Ms. Carder and other women do value life.
201d.
211 use the word "abortion" because an abortion involves removal of a fetus from a
woman's body. The fact that a fetus is aborted does not necessarily mean it must die. I
believe it is helpful conceptually to understand that the hospital and judge forced Ms.
Carder to abort the fetus, albeit in the dim hope that the fetus might live. In other words,
the cesarean itself was not a medical treatment; it was a coerced abortion. I borrow this
use of the word abortion from George Annas, supra note 6, at 24. I am surprised that
Burns describes the action as medical "treatment" or "forced surgery" rather than as an
abortion. (Burns, p. 190). Ironically, the court of appeals found that "this case is not
about abortion," 533 A.2d at 614, and was unable to see that the trial court had, in fact,
ordered an abortion.
22 The court of appeals concluded that "the surgery might have hastened her death."
533 A.2d at 613. It also stated that the surgery "may have shortened A.C.'s life span by
a few hours." Id. at 614. Burns apparently believes that the coerced abortion shortened
Ms. Carder's life by even more time. (Bums, p. 190 n.4).
23I agree with Burns that all feminist discussions must begin with a discussion of
women's well-being; I also agree with her that feminist briefs offering graphic descriptions
of the consequences of reproductive decisions for women's well-being have been
excellent.
24 Bums claims that my position on abortion is the same as Michael Perry's. (Bums,
n.8) That is simply not true. I criticize Perry in Ruth Colker, Abortion & Dialogue, 63
TUL. L. REv. 1363 (1989) and agree with Joan Williams' criticism of Perry's abortion
discussion, with which Burns also agrees. (Bums, n.8 (referring to Joan C. Williams,
Abortion, Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1651 (1989)).
5 Burns and I both agree that feminist arguments about reproductive choice should
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I would therefore begin with a discussion of Ms. Carder's well-
being. I would argue that only institutions that did not respect
Ms. Carder's well-being could act as did the trial court and hos-
pital, whose collective actions actually hastened Ms. Carder's
death without expressing concern for that eventuality. 26 Similarly,
the court of appeals failed to respect Ms. Carder's well-being by
ignoring the shortening of her life and not attempting to prevent
future repetition of such coercive actions. Ms. Carder received
far fewer procedural protections than we would ever permit in
the case of a criminal sentenced to death. Her wishes expressed
before the hearing were ignored, and the judges did not bother
to talk with her despite the fact that she regained consciousness
during the legal wrangling.2 7 The court had to treat Ms. Carder,
a live and conscious person, as if she was already dead to justify
this extraordinarily coercive action.
In addition, I would try to deconstruct the "selfishness" argu-
ments by showing how they are disrespectful to women's well-
being. I would look at the entire context in which Ms. Carder
acted to see a woman who had been diagnosed with leukemia
fifteen years earlier, gone into remission, become pregnant, and
now wanted to defy predictions that she and her fetus would die
in a couple of days. By stereotyping her as a selfish woman, as
the opinion implicitly suggests, the court could not see the con-
text in which Ms. Carder was acting to protect her own and
others' well-being. A group-based equality approach could bring
that context to the forefront by bringing Ms. Carder's entire life,
rather than the relatively momentary period of pregnancy, to the
court's attention. It is only through sexist stereotypes about preg-
nant women that the court could justify its actions. 28 Such sexist
predicates to state action, I would argue, are unconstitutional
focus on the entire context of women's lives. Where we disagree is that I believe an
equality approach achieves that end better than a privacy approach.
7 Although the superior court heard medical testimony that Ms. Carder would "prob-
ably die within the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours" even absent the physical strain
that surgery placed on her body, I agree with George Annas that the additional burden
of recovery from major surgery and the knowlege of her child's death was deleterious to
her own survival. See Annas, supra note 6, at 24; see also discussion supra note 21.
2 See id.; 533 A.2d 613.
2 Thus, I agree with George Annas, who has written that "[tihe ultimate rationale for
the decision may be purely sexist," although I would substitute "was" for "may be."
Annas, supra note 6, at 25.
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under the liberty component of the due process clause or the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
29
Having established that the hospital's decision and the court's
action were predicated on an unconstitutional disrespect for Ms.
Carder's well-being, I would respond to the asserted justification
for this action-the protection of fetal life. 30 In responding to this
asserted justification, I acknowledge that society benefits by val-
uing life in all of its various forms, including fetal life.3" From a
public policy perspective, I would insist that judges must face
the question of whether judicial intervention into these kinds of
cases serves any productive function. Is there reason to believe
that life would be more valued if judges rather than pregnant
women were responsible for making difficult reproductive deci-
sions?32 I believe the answer is clearly no. In my view, Ms.
Carder, for example, demonstrated an extremely high valuation
of life in all of its various forms. As I see it, her valuation of
potential life led her to become pregnant and decide to bear the
enormous burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. It also led her to
conclude that a cesarean section should occur at the twenty-
eighth week of her pregnancy rather than the twenty-sixth week.
Her valuation of the quality of the life of her husband and mother
led her to want not to impose upon them the burdens of raising
a severely disabled child. The valuation of her own life led her
to conclude that she should be permitted to live as comfortably
as possible for the last weeks of her life. By contrast, a superior
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. By substituting their judgment for that of the woman, her
family, and her physician in a brief time period without knowledge of the entire situation,
judges seriously undermine basic procedural protections while dramatically infringing a
woman's liberty interest. The Supreme Court of Canada, by contrast, has unanimously
ruled that a sexual partner could not intervene in private, reproductive decisions. See
Jean-Guy Tremblay v. Chantal Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530, 533 (unanimously agreeing to
set aside injunction obtained by Tremblay against Daigle, his former girlfriend, from
having an abortion).
30 Burns says that I believe that the fetus should be the "focal" point of the discussion.
(Burns, p. 000). I never make that claim. I agree that we should begin by discussing how
state action, or anything else at issue, affects women's well-being. I argue that we should
then respond to the state's purported pro-life arguments.
3' By "letting in the fetus," I am not saying that we should consider the fetus to be a
person or separate entity with rights, and I am not saying that society is entitled to protect
fetal life by acting coercively in women's lives. I am saying that it is appropriate for
society to be concerned about the ways that we demonstrate our commitment to and
concern about life. I want feminists and others to discuss abortion in ways that make
clear that we celebrate life, not the destruction of life.
32 See Annas, supra note 6, at 25.
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court judge's clumsy one-hour intervention and an ineffectual
fifteen-minute "appeal" were predicated on enormous disrespect
for the length and quality of Ms. Carder's life and did not further
the length and quality of the fetus' life. 33
A major problem underlying the court's analysis is its insis-
tence on viewing the case as one of competing rights-the rights
of the pregnant woman versus the rights of the fetus. By sug-
gesting an equality approach which "lets in the fetus," I am trying
to remove us from a bipolar, oppositional way of thinking about
pregnant women and their fetuses. My approach shows how the
pregnant woman's interests and the fetus' interests coincide
rather than conflict. By showing how women generally make
difficult reproductive decisions because of rather than in spite of
their valuation of life in its various forms, I believe we can
persuade people that pregnant women are the people most likely
to protect life in all of its forms. It is they, therefore, who deserve
decision-making responsibility for reproductive choices, rather
than judges who are accustomed to thinking about pregnant
women and fetal life as oppositional.
More generally, we can conclude from the Carder case that
judicial intervention serves no productive function. Judges are
no more likely to protect the interest in life, in all of its various
forms, than the pregnant woman who is facing a highly contex-
tualized ethical dilemma. In addition, the possibility of judicial
intervention stalls our health care system because risk managers
feel compelled to turn to a court to ask "what should we do?" as
they did in the Carder case, rather than communicate directly
with the people involved-the pregnant woman, her family, and
her physicians-and immediately begin desired and effective
treatment. 34 Judges need to understand that they peform no pro-
ductive function by trying to act as "God" in these kinds of cases,
pretending that there is an ultimate "right" ethical answer that
they can determine abstractly in a brief time period; all they
demonstrate is their disrespect for family members by substitut-
33 Notably, the nonviable fetus died approximately two hours after the surgical proce-
dure was performed. See id. at 24.
3 See id. at 25 (observing that "[tio ask judges to make the treatment decision to protect
the hospital from some speculative potential liability simply invites them to play doctor;
something they might enjoy, but something about which judges possess no more com-
petence than the average person on the street").
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ing their abstract judgment for the highly contextualized judgment
of the people who are dealing with a difficult ethical dilemma.35
The ultimate irony in the Carder case is that Ms. Carder was
not choosing an abortion-she was choosing to continue her
pregnancy in the hope that she might live for a few more weeks.
She had planned her pregnancy and looked forward to the birth
of a healthy child. That the state could intervene to abort her
nonviable fetus and hasten her death should offend our valuation
of life and choice. Thus, I am not afraid to discuss the Carder
case by "letting in the fetus." In fact, I think that by doing so I
create a more effective argument. But I leave that conclusion for
the reader to judge.
3- More generally, this kind of judicial intervention stalls our healthcare system by
making physicians afraid to perform an abortion, as well as afraid not to perform an
abortion, because someone other than the woman can make the decision.
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